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ON THE PROOF COMPLEXITY OF DEEP INFERENCE
PAOLA BRUSCOLI AND ALESSIO GUGLIELMI
Abstract. We obtain two results about the proof complexity of deep inference: 1) deep-
inference proof systems are as powerful as Frege ones, even when both are extended with
the Tseitin extension rule or with the substitution rule; 2) there are analytic deep-inference
proof systems that exhibit an exponential speedup over analytic Gentzen proof systems
that they polynomially simulate.
1. Introduction
Deep inference is a relatively new methodology in proof theory, consisting in deal-
ing with proof systems whose inference rules are applicable at any depth inside formulae
[Gug07b]. We obtain two results about the proof complexity of deep inference:
• deep-inference proof systems are as powerful as Frege ones, even when both are
extended with the Tseitin extension rule or with the substitution rule;
• there are analytic deep-inference proof systems that exhibit an exponential speed-
up over analytic Gentzen proof systems that they polynomially simulate.
These results are established for the calculus of structures, or CoS, the simplest formal-
ism in deep inference [Gug07b], and in particular for its proof system SKS, introduced
by Bru¨nnler in [Bru¨04] and then extensively studied [Bru¨03a, Bru¨03b, Bru¨06a, Bru¨06d,
BG04, BT01].
Our contributions fit in the following picture.
CoS +
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CoS +
substitution
Frege +
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Frege +
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⋆
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The notation F G indicates that formalism F polynomially simulates formalism G ;
the notation F G× indicates that it is known that this does not happen.
The left side of the picture represents, in part, the following. Analytic Gentzen systems,
i.e., Gentzen proof systems without the cut rule, can only prove certain formulae, which
we call ‘Statman tautologies’, with proofs that grow exponentially in the size of the for-
mulae. On the contrary, Gentzen systems with the cut rule can prove Statman tautologies
by polynomially growing proofs. So, Gentzen systems p-simulate analytic Gentzen ones,
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but not vice versa [Sta78]. Cook and Reckhow proved that Frege and Gentzen systems
are polynomially equivalent, i.e., each Frege system polynomially simulates any Gentzen
system and vice versa [CR74].
In the box at the right of the figure, ‘extension’ refers to the Tseitin extension rule,
and ‘substitution’ to the substitution rule. The works of Cook and Reckhow [CR79] and
Krajı´cˇek and Pudla´k [KP89] established that Frege + extension and Frege + substitution
are polynomially equivalent. It is immediate to see that these formalisms polynomially
simulate Frege and Gentzen, which, in turn, polynomially simulate analytic Gentzen. It is
a major open problem to establish whether Frege polynomially simulates Frege + exten-
sion/substitution.
In this work, we establish the following results (numbered as in the previous figure):
(1) Analytic Gentzen does not polynomially simulate analytic CoS (essentially in the
form of system SKS without cut); in fact, Statman tautologies admit polynomially
growing proofs in analytic CoS (Theorem 3.12).
(2) CoS and Frege are polynomially equivalent (Theorems 4.7 and 4.12).
(3) There is a natural notion of (Tseitin) extension for CoS, and CoS + extension is
polynomially equivalent to Frege + extension (Theorem 5.6).
(4) There is a natural notion of substitution for CoS, and CoS + substitution polyno-
mially simulates CoS + extension (Theorem 5.12).
(5) Frege + substitution polynomially simulates CoS + substitution; this way, we
know that all extended formalisms are polynomially equivalent (Theorem 5.14).
The polynomial simulations indicated by ⋆ arcs in the picture follow from the others.
Establishing whether analytic CoS polynomially simulates CoS is an open problem.
After the necessary preliminaries, in Section 2, we see how CoS expresses Gentzen
systems, including their properties, like analyticity, and then in Section 3 how it provides
for exponentially more compact proofs. The relation between CoS and Frege systems is
explored in Section 4 and the extensions are studied in Section 5. We conclude the article
with a list of open problems, in Section 6.
2. Preliminaries
In this section, we quickly introduce the necessary deep-inference notions. A more
extensive treatment of much of this material is in Bru¨nnler’s [Bru¨04].
We only need the following, basic proof complexity notions (see [CR79]).
Definition 2.1. A (propositional) proof system is a binary relation S between formulae
α and proofs Π such that S is computable in polynomial time, and the formula α is a
tautology if and only if there is a proof Π such that S(α,Π); in this case we say that Π is
a proof of α in S. We say that proof system S p-simulates proof system S′ if there is a
polynomial-time computable algorithm that transforms every proof in S′ into a proof in S
of the same tautology. Two proof systems are p-equivalent if each p-simulates the other.
Remark 2.2. In the following, we state theorems on the existence of proofs in one proof
system when proofs exist in another proof system, such that their size is polynomially
related. Implicitly, we always mean that the new proofs are obtained by transforming the
old ones by way of a polynomial-time computable algorithm.
Deep inference is a relatively recent development in proof theory. Its main idea is
to provide a finer analysis of inference than possible with traditional methods, and one
of the main objectives is to obtain a geometric semantics for proofs, inspired by linear
logic’s proof nets [Gir87]. Another objective is to provide a uniform and useful syntactic
treatment of several logics, especially modal ones, for which no satisfactory proof theory
existed before.
In deep inference, several formalisms can be defined with excellent structural proper-
ties, like locality for all the inference rules. The calculus of structures [Gug07b] is one
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of them and is now well developed for classical [Bru¨03a, Bru¨06a, Bru¨06d, BT01], intu-
itionistic [Tiu06a], linear [Str02, Str03b], modal [Bru¨06c, GT07, Sto07] and commuta-
tive/noncommutative logics [Gug07b, Tiu06b, Str03a, Bru02, DG04, GS01, GS02, GS09,
Kah06b, Kah07]; for all these logics, quantification can be defined at any order. We em-
phasise that deep inference is developing the first reasonable proof theory for modal logics;
the large number of different modal logic systems can be studied in simple and modular
deep-inference systems, which are similar to their propositional logic counterparts and en-
joy the same locality properties. The calculus of structures promoted the discovery of a
new class of proof nets for classical and linear logic [LS05a, LS05b, LS06, SL04] (see
also [Gui06]). Moreover, there exist implementations in Maude of deep-inference proof
systems [Kah08].
In this article, we focus on the calculus of structures because it is well developed and is
probably the simplest formalism definable in deep inference. The complexity results that
we present here are not dependent on the choice of formalism; rather, they only depend on
the deep-inference methodology and the finer granularity of inference rules that it yields.
Adopting deep inference basically means that it is possible to replace subformulae inside
formulae by other, implied subformulae, and that there is no limit to the nesting depth of
subformulae. Formalisms like Gentzen’s sequent calculus differ because they only rewrite
formulae, or sequents, around their root connectives, and (we argue) they suffer excessive
rigidity in the syntax and they do not sufficiently support geometric semantics.
Because of its geometric nature, it is important, in deep inference, to control whether
propositional variables can be instantiated by formulae. In particular, normalisation (cut
elimination) in deep inference crucially depends on the availability of ‘atomic’ inference
rules, which are rules related to some topological invariants (see, for example, [GG08]
for normalisation in propositional logic). In practice, we need two kinds of propositional
variables: the atoms, only subject to renaming, and the formula variables, subject to (unre-
stricted) substitution. This distinction does not bear dramatic effects on proof complexity,
but it does allow for some finer measures than otherwise possible.
Definition 2.3. Formulae of the calculus of structures, or CoS, are denoted by α, β, γ, δ
and are freely built from: units, like f (false) and t (true); atoms a, b, c, d and a¯, ¯b, c¯, ¯d;
(formula) variables A, B, C, D and ¯A, ¯B, ¯C, ¯D; logical relations, like disjunction [α ∨ β]
and conjunction (α ∧ β). A formula is ground if it contains no variables. We usually omit
external brackets of formulae, and sometimes we omit dispensable brackets under associa-
tivity. We use ≡ to denote literal equality of formulae. The size |α| of a formula α is the
number of unit, atom, and variable occurrences appearing in it. On the set of atoms, there
is an involution ·¯, called negation (i.e., ·¯ is a bijection from the set of atoms to itself such
that ¯a¯ ≡ a); we require that a¯ . a for every a; when both a and a¯ appear in a formula,
we mean that atom a is mapped to a¯ by ·¯. An analogous involution is defined on the set of
formula variables. The (De Morgan) dual of a formula is obtained by exchanging disjunc-
tion and conjunction and applying negation to all atoms and variables; we denote duals by
using ·¯; for example, the De Morgan dual of α ≡ t ∨ (a ∧ [ ¯B ∨ c]) is α¯ ≡ f ∧ [a¯ ∨ (B ∧ c¯)]. A
context is a formula where one hole { } appears in the place of a subformula; for example,
A ∨ (b ∧ { }) is a context; the generic context is denoted by ξ{ }. The hole can be filled with
formulae; for example, if ξ{ } ≡ b ∧ [{ } ∨ c], then ξ{a} ≡ b ∧ [a ∨ c], ξ{b} ≡ b ∧ [b ∨ c] and
ξ{a ∧ B} ≡ b ∧ [(a ∧ B) ∨ c]. The size of ξ{ } is defined as |ξ{ }| = |ξ{a}| − 1.
Remark 2.4. We do not say that a is positive and a¯ is negative. It only matters that,
when a and a¯ appear in the same formula, if one is negative the other is positive. In
absence of disambiguating information, there are two ways in which ξ{b} might correspond
to b ∧ [b ∨ c]: one such that ξ{a} ≡ a ∧ [b ∨ c] and another such that ξ{a} ≡ b ∧ [a ∨ c].
The language of formulae is redundant because we can choose whether to use atoms
or formula variables whenever a propositional variable is needed. The distinction between
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atoms and formula variables only plays a role in the choice of applicable inference rules,
and this aspect is controlled by renamings and substitutions.
Definition 2.5. A renaming is a map from the set of atoms to itself, and is denoted by
{a1/b1, a2/b2, . . . }; we use ρ for renamings. A renaming of α by ρ = {a1/b1, a2/b2, . . . }
is indicated by αρ and is obtained by simultaneously substituting every occurrence of ai
in α by bi and every occurrence of a¯i by ¯bi; for example, if α ≡ a ∧ [b ∨ (a ∧ [a¯ ∨ C])]
then α{a/¯b, ¯b/c} ≡ ¯b ∧ [c¯ ∨ (¯b ∧ [b ∨ C])]. A substitution is a map from the set of for-
mula variables to formulae, denoted by {A1/β1, A2/β2, . . . }; we use σ for substitutions.
An instance of α by σ = {A1/β1, A2/β2, . . . } is indicated by ασ and is obtained by si-
multaneously substituting every occurrence of variable Ai in α by formula βi and every
occurrence of ¯Ai by the De Morgan dual of βi; for example, if α ≡ (A ∧ [A ∨ ¯A]) ∨ b then
α{A/(c ∧ ¯B)} ≡ ((c ∧ ¯B) ∧ [(c ∧ ¯B) ∨ [c¯ ∨ B]]) ∨ b.
Definition 2.6. A CoS (inference) rule ν is an expression αν
β
, where formulae α and β
are called premiss and conclusion, respectively. A (rule) instance γν
δ
of
α
ν
β
is such that
γ ≡ αρσ and δ ≡ βρσ, for some renaming ρ and substitution σ. For some context ξ{ }, a
CoS (inference) step, generated by rule αν
β
via its instance
γ
ν
δ
, is the expression
ξ{γ}
ν
ξ{δ}
.
Example 2.7. Given
t
i↓
A ∨ ¯A
and
t
ai↓
a ∨ a¯
, then
t
i↓ (A ∧ b) ∨ [ ¯A ∨ ¯b] is an instance of i↓ and
t
ν
b ∨ ¯b
is an instance of both i↓ and ai↓. The rule
A ∨ A
c↓
A
generates the inference step
[a ∨ b] ∧ [(c ∧ D) ∨ (c ∧ D)]
c↓ [a ∨ b] ∧ (c ∧ D) .
We usually classify deep-inference rules in three classes. For this, we rely on the notion
of linearity, which, in this context, essentially means the same as in term-rewriting: a
rewriting rule is linear if variables appear once in both sides of the rule. In other words, a
linear rule does not create or destroy anything. These are the three classes of rules:
(1) Atomic rules. They usually correspond to structural rules in Gentzen systems; in
normalisation and in semantics of proofs, they play a crucial role because they
express the causality relations between atoms, so shaping the geometry of proofs.
Their instances are obtained by renaming.
(2) Noninvertible linear rules. They usually correspond to logical rules in Gentzen
systems. Since they are noninvertible, they express proper inference choices, but
since they are linear, they do not alter the geometry of causality between atoms.
Their instances are obtained by substitution.
(3) Invertible linear rules. These rules are equivalences between formulae that do not
correspond to proper inference choices and have no impact on the geometry of
proofs. For this reason, they are usually gathered into one big equivalence relation
between formulae, corresponding to just one rule, defined via substitution.
The success of deep inference is due to its ability to separate rules into classes 1 and
2, which is only possible by adopting deep inference. The references to the ‘geometry of
proofs’ can be understood by reading [GG08, LS05b]. Class 3 allows us to greatly simplify
proofs and to hide, so to speak, a great deal of logical complexity (in the sense of size of
proofs). We start by defining our ‘class 3’ rule, the others being dependent on specific
proof systems.
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Commutativity
α ∨ β = β ∨ α
α ∧ β = β ∧ α
Associativity
[α ∨ β] ∨ γ = α ∨ [β ∨ γ]
(α ∧ β) ∧ γ = α ∧ (β ∧ γ)
Units
α ∨ f = α
α ∧ t = α
t ∨ t = t
f ∧ f = f
Context closure
if α = β then ξ{α} = ξ{β}
Figure 1. Equality = on formulae.
Definition 2.8. The equality relation = on formulae is defined by closing the equations in
Figure 1 by reflexivity, symmetry, transitivity and by applying context closure. We define
the inference rule = as
α
=
β
, where α = β.
The following remark helps in assessing how much complexity is hidden in =.
Remark 2.9. It is possible to decide α = β in polynomial time by reducing α and β to
some canonical form and comparing the canonical forms. A canonical form under = of
any given formula can be obtained, for example, by removing as many units as possible
and ordering units, atoms, and variables according to an arbitrary order; the canonical
form is normal for associativity and units equations, when these are orientated from left
to right. Let us assume a total order on the set of units, atoms, and variables; we now
see in detail how to find an equivalent canonical formula in the case of a formula only
containing one logical relation. On the formula, use commutativity until the minimal unit,
atom, or variable appears in the leftmost position, then use associativity, orientated from
left to right, until normality is reached. For example, on [b ∨ d] ∨ [c ∨ a], we perform the
steps
[b ∨ d] ∨ [c ∨ a]❀ [c ∨ a] ∨ [b ∨ d]❀ [a ∨ c] ∨ [b ∨ d]❀ a ∨ [c ∨ [b ∨ d]] .
This phase requires O(n) steps, where n is the size of the formula. We proceed the same
way on the subformula immediately following the first element, and so on recursively; for
example,
a ∨ [c ∨ [b ∨ d]]❀ a ∨ [[b ∨ d] ∨ c]❀ a ∨ [b ∨ [d ∨ c]]❀ a ∨ [b ∨ [c ∨ d]] .
The number of steps of the algorithm for a formula only containing one logical relation is
then O(n2). On a generic formula, the same algorithm can be used, with the same number-
of-steps complexity O(n2) on the size n of the given formula, by adopting the lexicographic
order induced by the given total order. This is an example, also involving an initial O(n)
phase of simplification of units:
(t ∧ t) ∧ [[a ∨ ([[b ∨ d] ∨ [c ∨ a]] ∧ [[B ∨ c] ∨ [t ∨ a]])] ∨ f]
❀ t ∧ [[a ∨ ([[b ∨ d] ∨ [c ∨ a]] ∧ [[B ∨ c] ∨ [t ∨ a]])] ∨ f]
❀ [[a ∨ ([[b ∨ d] ∨ [c ∨ a]] ∧ [[B ∨ c] ∨ [t ∨ a]])] ∨ f] ∧ t
❀ [a ∨ ([[b ∨ d] ∨ [c ∨ a]] ∧ [[B ∨ c] ∨ [t ∨ a]])] ∨ f
❀ a ∨ ([[b ∨ d] ∨ [c ∨ a]] ∧ [[B ∨ c] ∨ [t ∨ a]])
❀
⋆ a ∨ ([a ∨ [b ∨ [c ∨ d]]] ∧ [[B ∨ c] ∨ [t ∨ a]])
❀
⋆ a ∨ ([a ∨ [b ∨ [c ∨ d]]] ∧ [t ∨ [a ∨ [c ∨ B]]])
❀ a ∨ ([t ∨ [a ∨ [c ∨ B]]] ∧ [a ∨ [b ∨ [c ∨ d]]])
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❀ ([t ∨ [a ∨ [c ∨ B]]] ∧ [a ∨ [b ∨ [c ∨ d]]]) ∨ a .
This way we obtain a (unique, of course) canonical formula in O(n2) steps, given any
formula of size n, so we can decide the equivalence of two formulae α and β in O(n2)
steps, where n = |α| + |β|. Notice that at each step the size of the formula stays the same or
diminishes.
Definition 2.10. A CoS (proof ) system is a finite set of inference rules. A CoS derivation
Φ of length k in proof system S, whose premiss is α0 and conclusion is αk, is a chain of
inference steps
Φ =
α0
ν1
α1
ν2
...
νk−1
αk−1
νk
αk
,
such that ν1, . . . , νk is a sequence of inference rules that alternate between the = rule and
any rule of system S, where k ≥ 0. The same derivation can be indicated by
α0
Φ
‖
‖ S
αk
, when
the details are known or irrelevant; a proof is a derivation whose premiss is t. A derivation
is ground if it contains no variables. Sometimes, we omit to indicate the inference steps
generated by =. The size |Φ| of derivation Φ is the number of unit, atom, and variable
occurrences appearing in it. We denote by ξ{Φ} the result of including every formula of
Φ into the context ξ{ }. We denote by Φρ and Φσ the expression obtained from Φ by
applying renaming ρ and substitution σ to every formula in Φ. A CoS proof system that,
for every valid implication α→ β, contains a derivation with premiss α and conclusion β, is
said to be implicationally complete.
Remark 2.11. IfΦ is a derivation, then ξ{Φ}, Φρ, andΦσ are derivations, for every context
ξ{ }, renaming ρ, and substitution σ.
We use the notion of groundness to relate the complexity of deep-inference proof sys-
tems with atomic rules to proof systems without atomic rules, including those outside of
deep inference. Due to the aforementioned redundancy in the language, groundness is not
really a restriction.
Remark 2.12. Every nonground derivation can be transformed into an equivalent,
ground one, by replacing variables with atoms in such a way that newly introduced atoms
are different from the already present one.
We can now define some deep-inference proof systems. System SKS is the most impor-
tant for the proof theory of classical logic, because of its atomic structural rules. System
SKSg relates SKS to proof systems in other formalisms, like Frege.
Definition 2.13. CoS proof systems KSg = {i↓,w↓, c↓, s}, SKSg = KSg ∪ {i↑,w↑,
c↑}, KS = {ai↓, aw↓, ac↓, s,m} and SKS = KS ∪ {ai↑, aw↑, ac↑} are defined in Figures 2
and 3, for a language containing f, t, disjunction, and conjunction. Proof systems where
none of the rules i↑, ai↑, w↑, and aw↑ appear are said to be analytic.
ON THE PROOF COMPLEXITY OF DEEP INFERENCE 7
Structural rules Logical rule
SKSg



A ∧ ¯A
i↑
f
A
w↑
t
A
c↑
A ∧ A
cointeraction coweakening cocontraction
or cut
t
i↓
A ∨ ¯A
f
w↓
A
A ∨ A
c↓
A
A ∧ [B ∨ C]
s (A ∧ B) ∨ C



KSg
interaction weakening contraction switch
or identity
Figure 2. Systems SKSg and KSg.
Atomic structural rules Logical rules
SKS



a ∧ a¯
ai↑
f
a
aw↑
t
a
ac↑
a ∧ a
cointeraction coweakening cocontraction
or cut
t
ai↓
a ∨ a¯
f
aw↓
a
a ∨ a
ac↓
a
A ∧ [B ∨ C]
s (A ∧ B) ∨ C
(A ∧ B) ∨ (C ∧ D)
m [A ∨ C] ∧ [B ∨ D]



KS
interaction weakening contraction switch medial
or identity
Figure 3. Systems SKS and KS.
Example 2.14. This is a valid derivation in all CoS proof systems defined previously (and
it plays a role in the proof of Lemma 3.11):
γ ∨ [(([α¯ ∨ α] ∧ c) ∧ (α ∧ d)) ∨ δ]
=
γ ∨ [(((α ∧ d) ∧ c) ∧ [α ∨ α¯]) ∨ δ]
s
γ ∨ [[(((α ∧ d) ∧ c) ∧ α) ∨ α¯] ∨ δ]
= [α¯ ∨ γ] ∨ [((α ∧ c) ∧ (α ∧ d)) ∨ δ]
.
Note that SKSg, KSg, SKS, and KS are closed under renaming and substitution (see
Remark 2.11). This is so because of the distinction between atoms and formula variables.
Obtaining the closure of these and other systems under renaming and substitution is one of
the main technical reasons for distinguishing between atoms and variables.
The following theorem is proved in [Bru¨04], and follows immediately from Section 3.1,
where we prove that CoS systems p-simulate Gentzen systems.
Theorem 2.15. (Bru¨nnler) Systems SKSg, KSg, SKS, and KS are complete; systems
SKSg and SKS are implicationally complete.
The theorem holds also when restricting the language to ground derivations, since sys-
tems SKS and KS apply to them.
In the presence of cut, the coweakening and cocontraction rules do not play a major role
in terms of proof complexity:
Theorem 2.16. Systems SKSg and KSg∪ i↑ are p-equivalent, and systems SKS and KS∪
ai↑ are p-equivalent.
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Proof. Observe that the rules w↑ and c↑ can be derived in KSg ∪ i↑:
A
=
A ∧ [f ∨ t]
s (A ∧ f) ∨ t
w↓ (A ∧ ¯A) ∨ t
i↑
f ∨ t
=
t
and
A
=
A ∧ t
i↓
A ∧ [[ ¯A ∨ ¯A] ∨ (A ∧ A)]
s (A ∧ [ ¯A ∨ ¯A]) ∨ (A ∧ A)
c↓ (A ∧ ¯A) ∨ (A ∧ A)
i↑
f ∨ (A ∧ A)
=
A ∧ A
.
Similar constructions hold in KS ∪ i↑ for aw↑ and ac↑. 
It turns out that all the systems mentioned in the previous theorem are p-equivalent, as
a consequence of Corollary 2.23.
Analytic systems are formally defined in Definition 2.13 for CoS, and 3.2 for Gentzen.
Those definitions are specific to different systems in different formalisms, which is not
necessarily satisfactory. Defining a general, syntax-independent concept of analyticity is a
subject of ongoing research (see Problem 6.4). We briefly discuss now the notion of ana-
lyticity and its connections with the proof complexity of deep inference, as an introduction
to our result on Statman tautologies.
A Gentzen system is said to be analytic when it does not contain the cut rule. Analytic
Gentzen systems enjoy the ‘subformula property’, i.e., proofs in these systems only contain
subformulae of their conclusions. In fact, we might stipulate that enjoying the subformula
property is a primitive notion of analyticity, which we can use to exclude the cut rule, as
desired. In analytic Gentzen proofs, all formulae have lower or equal complexity than
that of the conclusion, when complexity is measured, for example, as the and/or depth of a
formula (i.e., the number of alternations of conjunction and disjunction; see Definition 6.3).
There is another property, of interest to us, that analytic Gentzen systems enjoy: given an
inference rule and its conclusion, there are only finitely many premisses to choose from;
we call such rules ‘finitely generating’. The cut rule in Gentzen does not possess the
subformula property nor is it finitely generating.
The primitive notion of analyticity that we are currently adopting for CoS is different
from the one for Gentzen. We stipulate that a rule is analytic if its premiss is a formula
obtained from a formula scheme by instantiating it with subformulae of the conclusion
(so, the premiss is not just a subformula of the conclusion). This means that no atom or
variable can appear in the premiss of an analytic rule that does not appear in its conclusion.
It is, of course, a weaker condition than asking for the subformula property of Gentzen
systems, but doing so is necessary if we want to adopt deep inference and obtain linear
rules. Like the subformula property does for Gentzen, this weaker notion for CoS excludes
the cut rule, but also the coweakening one. However, this is not an important difference
with the sequent calculus because coweakening is irrelevant for the proof complexity of
a CoS system (see, for example [GG08]). The reason for dealing with coweakening is
that, given the potential importance of cocontraction for proof complexity, we preferred to
introduce top-down-symmetric CoS systems (so, closed by duality), even if coweakening
and cocontraction are not required for completeness.
So, the two notions of analyticity, for Gentzen and for CoS, are such that the only
important rules that are not analytic are the respective cut rules. Note that in both cases,
analytic systems are made of finitely generating rules. However, there is an important
difference: in CoS, the complexity of formulae in an analytic proof can be unboundedly
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greater than the complexity of the conclusion. Consider, for example, the derivation
c ∨ (a ∧ [b ∨ [c ∨ (a ∧ b)])
s
c ∨ [(a ∧ b) ∨ [c ∨ (a ∧ b)]]
= [c ∨ (a ∧ b)] ∨ [c ∨ (a ∧ b)]
c↓
c ∨ (a ∧ b)
.
The and/or depth of the conclusion is 1, while that of the premiss is 3. We could repeat the
construction on top of itself and further increase the and/or depth of the premiss at will.
Deep-inference systems can be top-down symmetric in the sense that a derivation can
be flipped upside-down and negated and still be a valid derivation (we say that two such
derivations are dual). Accordingly, some forms of analyticity can be defined in a symmetric
way. Then, typically asymmetric theorems that depend on the notion of analyticity, like
cut elimination, can be generalised to symmetric statements that imply cut elimination.
This is not the place to be detailed about this aspect; suffice to say that we can obtain for
CoS systems much stronger normalisation (and cut elimination) results than for Gentzen
systems (see [Bru¨06b, GG08]).
As we see in Section 3.1, analyticity in CoS faithfully captures analyticity in Gentzen,
in the sense that analytic CoS can produce isomorphic proofs to Gentzen ones (almost
amounting to a change of notation). However, analytic CoS admits more proofs than an-
alytic Gentzen, and, among CoS proofs, we can find some remarkably small ones, which
analytic Gentzen cannot express; this is the subject of Section 3.2 on Statman tautologies.
Remark 2.17. The rules of SKS are local, in the sense that, for any language with a
finite number of atoms, checking that a given expression is an instance of any of these
rules requires time bounded by a constant (adopting a tree representation of formulae,
for example). This property is peculiar to deep inference; it cannot be obtained in other
formalisms. For example, a traditional, nonatomic contraction rule is not local because
it requires checking the identity of two unbounded formulae. Contrary to other nonlocal
rules, like identity in a Gentzen system, contraction cannot be replaced by its local, atomic
counterpart without losing completeness. A counterexample showing this is in [Bru¨03b].
Locality can possibly lead to a new, general, productive notion of analyticity, as argued in
Problem 6.4.
We conclude the section by showing the p-equivalence of systems with atomic rules to
systems without atomic rules. We start by proving the result on ground derivations.
Lemma 2.18. For every ground instance
t
i↓
α ∨ α¯
there is a derivation
t
Φ
‖
‖ {ai↓,s}
α ∨ α¯
and for
every ground instance
α ∧ α¯
i↑
f
there is a derivation
α ∧ α¯
Φ
‖
‖ {ai↑,s}
f
; in both cases |Φ| ∈ O(n2),
where n = |α|.
Proof. Let us see the case for i↑, the other being its dual. We make an induction on the
structure of α. The cases when α is a unit or an atom are trivial: in the former case Φ
consists of an instance of = and in the latter the instance of i↑ is also an instance of ai↑. We
only have to consider the case when α ≡ β ∨ γ: we apply the induction hypothesis on the
derivation
[β ∨ γ] ∧ ( ¯β ∧ γ¯)
= ( ¯β ∧ [β ∨ γ]) ∧ γ¯
s [( ¯β ∧ β) ∨ γ] ∧ γ¯
i↑ [f ∨ γ] ∧ γ¯
=
γ ∧ γ¯
i↑
f
,
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and we obtain a derivation whose length is O(n), and so its size is O(n2), where n = |α|. 
Lemma 2.19. For every ground instance
f
w↓
α
there is a derivation
f
Φ
‖
‖ {aw↓,s}
α
and for
every ground instance
α
w↑
t
there is a derivation
α
Φ
‖
‖ {aw↑,s}
t
; in both cases |Φ| ∈ O(n2),
where n = |α|.
Proof. The proof is similar to the one for Lemma 2.18. In case α ≡ t an instance of w↓
yields
f
=
f ∧ [f ∨ t]
s (f ∧ f) ∨ t
=
t
;
we can do similarly if α ≡ f in an instance of w↑. These are the derivations for the inductive
cases about w↓ (those about w↑ are dual):
f
w↓
γ
=
f ∨ γ
w↓
β ∨ γ
and
f
=
f ∧ f
w↓
f ∧ γ
w↓
β ∧ γ
.
From these we obtain a derivation whose length is O(n), and so its size is O(n2), where
n = |α|. 
Remark 2.20. In the statement of Lemma 2.19, instead of {aw↓, s} and {aw↑, s} we could
have used {aw↓,m} and {aw↑,m}, respectively.
Lemma 2.21. For every ground instance
α ∨ α
c↓
α
there is a derivation
α ∨ α
Φ
‖
‖ {ac↓,m}
α
and for
every ground instance
α
c↑
α ∧ α
there is a derivation
α
Φ
‖
‖ {ac↑,m}
α ∧ α
; in both cases |Φ| ∈ O(n2),
where n = |α|.
Proof. The proof is similar to the one for Lemma 2.18. These are the derivations for the
inductive cases about c↓ (those about c↑ are dual):
[β ∨ γ] ∨ [β ∨ γ]
= [β ∨ β] ∨ [γ ∨ γ]
c↓
β ∨ [γ ∨ γ]
c↓
β ∨ γ
and
(β ∧ γ) ∨ (β ∧ γ)
m [β ∨ β] ∧ [γ ∨ γ]
c↓
β ∧ [γ ∨ γ]
c↓
β ∧ γ
.
From these we obtain a derivation whose length is O(n), and so its size is O(n2), where
n = |α|. 
Theorem 2.22. For every ground SKSg derivation Φ there is a ground SKS derivation
Φ′ with the same premiss and conclusion of Φ; if n is the size of Φ then the size of Φ′ is
O(n2); moreover, if Φ is in KSg then Φ′ is in KS.
Proof. The theorem follows immediately from Lemmas 2.18, 2.19, and 2.21. 
By Remark 2.12, every derivation can be ‘grounded’, so:
Corollary 2.23. KS and KSg are p-equivalent and SKS and SKSg are p-equivalent.
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φ, A ¯A, ψ
cut
φ, ψ
cut
id
A, ¯A
t
t
φ
w
φ, A
φ, A, A
c
φ, A
φ, A, B
∨
φ, A ∨ B
φ, A B, ψ
∧
φ, A ∧ B, ψ
identity true weakening contraction disjunction conjunction
Figure 4. System Gentzen.
Remark 2.24. Sometimes, we use nonatomic structural rule instances in SKS and KS
derivations: those instances actually stand for the SKS and KS derivations that would
be obtained according to the proofs of Lemmas 2.18, 2.19, and 2.21. In this sense, we
say that i↓, i↑, w↓, w↑, c↓, and c↑ are ‘macro’ rules for SKS and KS. The reason we
might want to work with macro rules in SKS and KS instead of working in SKSg and
KSg and then appealing to Theorem 2.22 is to obtain finer upper bounds. This is because
the size of formulae over which nonatomic structural rules operate can be much smaller
than the square root of the size of a derivation, which is the pessimistic assumption of
Theorem 2.22.
Remark 2.25. All implicationally complete CoS proof systems are p-equivalent. This can
be proved analogously to, or resorting to, a similar ‘robustness’ result for Frege systems
(Theorem 4.2), as argued in Remark 4.13. This means that studying proof complexity for
SKSg and SKS has universal value for all CoS systems for propositional logic.
3. Calculus of Structures, Gentzen Proof Systems and Statman Tautologies
There are two parts in this section. In the first part, we show how CoS naturally p-
simulates Gentzen systems, and in particular how it realizes Gentzen’s notion of analyticity.
In the second part, we show that analytic CoS admits polynomial proofs when analytic
Gentzen only has exponential ones, in the case of Statman tautologies.
3.1. Calculus of Structures and Gentzen Proof Systems. In this section, we adopt a
specific one-sided (Gentzen-Schu¨tte) sequent system that we call Gentzen (and that is
called GS1p in [TS96]). We could have adopted any other style of presentation without
affecting our results. In fact, for Gentzen systems an analogous ‘robustness’ theorem to
that for Frege systems (Theorem 4.2) can be established. This means that studying the
proof complexity of Gentzen has universal value for the class of Gentzen systems.
Definition 3.1. Over the language of SKS formulae, the sequent-calculus proof system
Gentzen is defined by the inference rules in Figure 4, where φ and ψ stand for multisets
of formulae and the symbol ‘,’ represents multiset union. We interpret multisets of for-
mulae as their disjunction (where associativity is irrelevant). Derivations, denoted by ∆,
are trees obtained by composing instances of inference rules; the leaves of a derivation are
its premisses and the root is its conclusion; a derivation ∆ with premisses φ1, . . . , φh and
conclusion ψ is denoted by
φ1 . . . φh
∆
ψ
.
A derivation with no premisses is a proof. The size |∆| of derivation ∆ is the number of
unit, atom, and variable occurrences appearing in it. In the following, every SKS formula
is translated into a Gentzen formula in the obvious way, and vice versa; in particular, we
translate a Gentzen multiset φ = α1, . . . , αh into α1 ∨ · · · ∨ αh.
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In the language, we keep the distinction between atoms and variables because, thanks
to atoms, we obtain a better upper bound for the size of Statman tautologies proofs, in
the Section 3.2. As we said in the case of CoS, the redundancy in the language has no
consequences outside of the possibility of using certain CoS rules instead of others.
Definition 3.2. The proof system analytic Gentzen is proof system Gentzen without the
cut rule; analytic derivations and proofs are those derivations and proofs in Gentzen where
no instances of the cut rule appear.
We know, of course, that both Gentzen and analytic Gentzen are complete, and that
Gentzen proofs can be transformed into analytic Gentzen proofs by a cut-elimination
procedure, which, in general, blows-up a given proof exponentially.
Every Gentzen derivation has natural counterparts in CoS: the idea is to (arbitrarily)
sequentialise its tree structure. This is possible because the natural logical relation between
tree branches is conjunction, which CoS can represent, of course. In doing so, we pay
in terms of complexity because the tree structure is less redundant than CoS contexts:
the size of derivations grows quadratically. Other deep-inference formalisms (currently
under development, see [BL05, Gug04, Gug05]) are more efficient than CoS and Gentzen
formalisms in dealing with this so-called ‘bureaucracy’.
Remark 3.3. In the following, we assume that an empty conjunction can be represented
by a nonempty conjunction of t units.
Theorem 3.4. For every Gentzen derivation ∆ with premisses φ1, . . . , φh and conclusion
ψ there is a derivation
φ1 ∧ · · · ∧ φh
Φ
‖
‖ SKSg
ψ
; if n is the size of ∆, the size of Φ is O(n2); moreover,
if ∆ is analytic then Φ is in KSg.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the tree structure of ∆. The base cases id
A, ¯A
and t
t
are, respectively, translated into
t
i↓
A, ¯A
and t. The derivations
φ1 . . . φh
∆1
φ
w
φ, A
,
φ1 . . . φh
∆1
φ, A, A
c
φ, A
, and
φ1 . . . φh
∆1
φ, A, B
∨
φ, A ∨ B
are, respectively, translated into
φ1 ∧ · · · ∧ φh
Φ1
‖
‖ SKSg
φ
=
φ ∨ f
w↓
φ ∨ A
,
φ1 ∧ · · · ∧ φh
Φ1
‖
‖ SKSg
φ ∨ [A ∨ A]
c↓
φ ∨ A
, and
φ1 ∧ · · · ∧ φh
Φ1
‖
‖ SKSg
φ ∨ [A ∨ B]
,
where Φ1 is obtained by induction from ∆1, and some possibly necessary instances of the
= rule have been omitted (they depend on the exact translation of Gentzen multisets into
SKSg formulae). The derivations
φ1 . . . φh
∆1
φ, A
φh+1 . . . φk
∆2
B, ψ
∧
φ, A ∧ B, ψ
and
φ1 . . . φh
∆1
φ, A
φh+1 . . . φk
∆2
¯A, ψ
cut
φ, ψ
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are, respectively, translated into
φ1 ∧ · · · ∧ φk
Φ1∧Φ2
‖
‖
[φ ∨ A] ∧ [B ∨ ψ]
= [B ∨ ψ] ∧ [A ∨ φ]
s ([B ∨ ψ] ∧ A) ∨ φ
=
φ ∨ (A ∧ [B ∨ ψ])
s
φ ∨ [(A ∧ B) ∨ ψ]
and
φ1 ∧ · · · ∧ φk
Φ1∧Φ2
‖
‖
[φ ∨ A] ∧ [ ¯A ∨ ψ]
= [ ¯A ∨ ψ] ∧ [A ∨ φ]
s ([ ¯A ∨ ψ] ∧ A) ∨ φ
=
φ ∨ (A ∧ [ ¯A ∨ ψ])
s
φ ∨ [(A ∧ ¯A) ∨ ψ]
i↑
φ ∨ [f ∨ ψ]
=
φ ∨ ψ
,
where Φ1 and Φ2 are obtained by induction from ∆1 and ∆2, some possibly necessary
instances of the = rule have been omitted, and Φ1 ∧Φ2 stands for the derivation
φ1 ∧ · · · ∧ φk
Φ1∧(φh+1∧···∧φk) ‖‖
[φ ∨ A] ∧ (φh+1 ∧ · · · ∧ φk)
[φ∨A]∧Φ2 ‖‖
[φ ∨ A] ∧ [B ∨ ψ]
,
where B is possibly instantiated by ¯A; the length of this derivation and the size of the largest
formula appearing in it are both O(n). The resulting O(n2) measure of these last two cases
dominates the others. 
Corollary 3.5. SKSg p-simulates Gentzen and KSg p-simulates analytic Gentzen.
Although it does not explicitly address complexity, [Bru¨04] is more exhaustive than the
aforesaid on the two-way translation between SKSg and Gentzen. Translating from SKSg
to Gentzen crucially employs the cut rule: for every inference step in SKSg, a cut instance
is used in Gentzen. So, while it is very natural and easy to show that Gentzen p-simulates
SKSg (see [Bru¨04]), we are left with the question: does analytic Gentzen p-simulate KSg?
3.2. Analytic Calculus of Structures on Statman Tautologies. We prove here that an-
alytic Gentzen does not p-simulate KSg. In fact, the CoS (polynomial) inefficiency in
dealing with context bureaucracy is compensated by its freedom in applying inference
rules, which leads to exponential speedups on certain classes of tautologies. Here, we
study Statman tautologies, which have been used to provide the classic lower bound for
analytic Gentzen systems: no cut-free proofs of Statman tautologies are possible in an-
alytic Gentzen without the proofs growing exponentially over the size of the tautologies
they prove [Sta78]. We show that, on the contrary, KSg and KS prove Statman tautologies
with polynomially growing analytic proofs.
Remark 3.6. The subset of SKSg only containing analytic rules is equal to KSg plus
the cocontraction rule. We do not know whether cocontraction provides for exponential
speedups, so separating, proof-complexity-wise, the class of KSg from that of ‘analytic
CoS’; about this, see Problem 6.2. In our opinion, the very notion of analyticity would
benefit from some further analysis; about this, see Problem 6.4.
Definition 3.7. For n ≥ 1, consider the following formulae:
αi ≡ c¯i ∨ ¯di for i ≥ 1,
βnk ≡
∧k
i=n αi ≡ αn ∧ β
n−1
k for n ≥ k > 1,
γnk ≡ β
n
k+1 ∧ ck for n > k ≥ 1,
δnk ≡ β
n
k+1 ∧ dk for n > k ≥ 1.
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Statman tautologies are, for n ≥ 1, the formulae:
Sn ≡ α¯n ∨ [(γnn−1 ∧ δnn−1) ∨ [· · · ∨ [(γn1 ∧ δn1) ∨ α1] · · ·]] .
Example 3.8. These are the first three Statman tautologies:
S1 ≡ (c1 ∧ d1) ∨ [c¯1 ∨ ¯d1] ,
S2 ≡ (c2 ∧ d2) ∨ [(([c¯2 ∨ ¯d2] ∧ c1) ∧ ([c¯2 ∨ ¯d2] ∧ d1)) ∨ [c¯1 ∨ ¯d1]] ,
S3 ≡ (c3 ∧ d3) ∨ [(([c¯3 ∨ ¯d3] ∧ c2) ∧ ([c¯3 ∨ ¯d3] ∧ d2)) ∨
[((([c¯3 ∨ ¯d3] ∧ [c¯2 ∨ ¯d2]) ∧ c1) ∧ (([c¯3 ∨ ¯d3] ∧ [c¯2 ∨ ¯d2]) ∧ d1)) ∨
[c¯1 ∨ ¯d1]]] .
It is perhaps easier to understand their meaning by using implication, as in
S′3 ≡ [c¯3 ∨ ¯d3] → ([([c¯3 ∨ ¯d3] → c¯2) ∨ ([c¯3 ∨ ¯d3] → ¯d2)] →
([(([c¯3 ∨ ¯d3] ∧ [c¯2 ∨ ¯d2]) → c¯1) ∨ (([c¯3 ∨ ¯d3] ∧ [c¯2 ∨ ¯d2]) → ¯d1)] →
[c¯1 ∨ ¯d1])) .
Remark 3.9. |Sn| = 2 + 2
∑n−1
k=1 |γ
n
k | + 2 = 2
∑n
k=2(|βnk | + 1) + 4 = 2n2 + 2.
It is not difficult to see why analytic Gentzen proofs of Statman tautologies grow expo-
nentially (this is a classic argument that can be found in many textbooks; see, for example,
[CK02]). Basically, all what analytic Gentzen can do while building a proof of Sn is to
generate a proof tree with O(2n) branches. The next lemma shows the crucial advantage
of deep inference over Gentzen systems: Statman tautologies can be proved ‘from the in-
side out’, which is precisely what Gentzen systems can only do by resorting to convoluted
proofs involving cuts (so, nonanalytic proofs).
Remark 3.10. In the following, for brevity, we label inference steps with expressions like
n · ν, to denote n inference steps involving rule ν.
Lemma 3.11. For Statman tautologies Sn and Sn+1 there exists a derivation
Sn
‖
‖ KS
Sn+1
whose
length is O(n) and size is O(n3).
Proof. We refer to Definition 3.7. The requested derivation is
Φ =
(cn ∧ dn) ∨
[((βnn ∧ cn−1) ∧ (βnn ∧ dn−1)) ∨ [· · · ∨
[((βn2 ∧ c1) ∧ (βn2 ∧ d1)) ∨ α1] · · ·]]2n · i↓ (([αn+1 ∨ α¯n+1] ∧ cn) ∧ ([αn+1 ∨ α¯n+1] ∧ dn)) ∨
[((([αn+1 ∨ α¯n+1] ∧ βnn) ∧ cn−1) ∧ (([αn+1 ∨ α¯n+1] ∧ βnn) ∧ dn−1)) ∨ [· · · ∨
[((([αn+1 ∨ α¯n+1] ∧ βn2) ∧ c1) ∧ (([αn+1 ∨ α¯n+1] ∧ βn2) ∧ d1)) ∨ α1] · · ·]]2n · s
2n
︷                                   ︸︸                                   ︷
[α¯n+1 ∨ [· · · ∨ [α¯n+1 ∨ α¯n+1] · · ·]] ∨
[((αn+1 ∧ cn) ∧ (αn+1 ∧ dn)) ∨
[(((αn+1 ∧ βnn) ∧ cn−1) ∧ ((αn+1 ∧ βnn) ∧ dn−1)) ∨ [· · · ∨
[(((αn+1 ∧ βn2) ∧ c1) ∧ ((αn+1 ∧ βn2) ∧ d1)) ∨ α1] · · ·]]](2n − 1) · c↓
α¯n+1 ∨
[((αn+1 ∧ cn) ∧ (αn+1 ∧ dn)) ∨
[(((αn+1 ∧ βnn) ∧ cn−1) ∧ ((αn+1 ∧ βnn) ∧ dn−1)) ∨ [· · · ∨
[(((αn+1 ∧ βn2) ∧ c1) ∧ ((αn+1 ∧ βn2) ∧ d1)) ∨ α1] · · ·]]]
,
where we use macro inference rules as explained in Remark 2.22. (Example 2.14 explains
the central step in the preceding derivation.) The formulae appearing in the middle of the
previous derivation are the largest. Since |αn+1| = 2 and |βnk | = 2(n − k + 1), their size is
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2n·2+6+2(3n−3+∑nk=2 |βnk |)+2 = 2n2+8n+2. Each i↓macro inference step involves one s
and two ai↓ steps in KS, for a total of six steps, including = ones; each c↓ macro inference
step involves one m and two ac↓ steps in KS, for a total of six steps. So, the length of Φ is
2n · 6 + 2n · 2 + (2n − 1) · 6 = 28n − 6, and so |Φ| ≤ (28n − 6)(2n2 + 8n + 2) ∈ O(n3). 
Note that in the previous proof, by working with macro inference rules, we get a better
upper bound for KS than if we worked in KSg and then applied Theorem 2.22.
Theorem 3.12. There are KS proofs of Statman tautologies whose size is quadratic in the
size of the tautologies they prove.
Proof. Tautology S1 is trivially provable by an instance of the i↓macro rule. By repeatedly
applying the previous lemma, we obtain proofs of all Statman tautologies Sn, whose size
is O(n4). Since |Sn| ∈ O(n2) (see Remark 3.9), the statement follows. 
This is enough to conclude that analytic Gentzen does not polynomially simulate KSg
and KS. Some could argue that Statman tautologies are artificial in their forcing exponen-
tial Gentzen proofs into ‘wildly’ branching. However, notice that both notions of proof
and analyticity in Gentzen systems ‘get into tautologies’ from the outside inwards. In
other words, the restricted notion of analyticity in Gentzen systems is strongly correlated
to the restricted notion of proof that leads to exponential-size proofs. In CoS, both notions
are more liberal, to the advantage of proof complexity. We pay a price for this in terms
of proof-search complexity: there is research aimed at improving the situation, with very
promising results; see [Kah06a].
We note that polynomial proofs on Statman tautologies are obtained by a very small
dose of deep inference. In fact, the trick is done by the switch and interaction instances in
the proof in Lemma 3.11: they all operate just below the ‘surface’ of a formula. This leads
us to state a currently open problem, in Section 6.6.
4. Calculus of Structures and Frege Systems
In this section, we prove that CoS and Frege systems are p-equivalent.
In the following definitions about Frege systems, we do not assume that the language of
formulae coincides with the CoS one, but, as always, this is not a very important issue.
Definition 4.1. Given a language of propositional logic formulae built over a complete
base of connectives, a Frege (proof ) system is a finite collection of sound inference rules,
each of which is a tuple of n > 0 formulae such that from n − 1 premisses one conclusion
is derived; inference rules with 0 premisses are called axioms. Given a Frege system, a
Frege derivation of length l with premisses α1, . . . , αh and conclusion βl is a sequence of
formulae β1, . . . , βl, such that each βi either belongs to {α1, . . . , αh} or is the conclusion of
an instance of an inference rule whose premisses belong to β1, . . . , βi−1, where 1 ≤ i ≤ l;
a Frege proof of β is a Frege derivation with no premisses and conclusion β; we use Υ for
derivations. We require of each Frege system to be implicationally complete, i.e., whenever
(α1 ∧ · · · ∧ αh) → β is valid there is a derivation with premisses α1, . . . , αh and conclusion
β in the proof system. The size of a Frege derivation Υ is the number of unit, atom, and
variable occurrences that it contains, and is indicated by |Υ|.
The following ‘robustness’ theorem can easily be proved.
Theorem 4.2. (Robustness, Cook-Reckhow, [CR79]) All Frege systems in the same lan-
guage are p-equivalent.
The theorem has been generalised by Reckhow to Frege systems in any language (under
‘natural translations’) [Rec76], but we do not need this level of generality in our article.
The robustness theorem allows us to work with just one Frege system, and we arbitrarily
choose the following, taken from [Bus87] and modified by adding axioms F14, F15, F16,
and F17 in order to deal with units.
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Axioms:
F1 ≡ A → (B → (A ∧ B))
F2 ≡ (A ∧ B) → A
F3 ≡ (A ∧ B) → B
F4 ≡ A → [A ∨ B]
F5 ≡ B → [A ∨ B]
F6 ≡ ¬¬A → A
F7 ≡ A → ¬¬A
F8 ≡ A → (B → A)
F9 ≡ ¬A → (A → B)
F10 ≡ (A → (B → C)) → ((A → B) → (A → C))
F11 ≡ (A → C) → ((B → C) → ([A ∨ B] → C))
F12 ≡ (A → (B → C)) → (B → (A → C))
F13 ≡ (A → B) → (¬B → ¬A)
F14 ≡ f → (A ∧ ¬A)
F15 ≡ (A ∧ ¬A) → f
F16 ≡ t → [A ∨ ¬A]
F17 ≡ [A ∨ ¬A] → t
Inference rule:
A A → B
mp
B
Figure 5. System Frege.
Definition 4.3. Frege system Frege, over the language of formulae freely generated by
units, non-negated formula variables, and the connectives ∨, ∧, →, and ¬, has inference
rules as shown in Figure 5, where the formulae F1, . . . , F17 are axioms and the inference
rule mp is called modus ponens.
Remark 4.4. In the following, every SKS formula is implicitly translated into a Frege
formula in the obvious way, and vice versa; in particular, we translate Frege’s formulae of
the kind α → β into SKS formulae α¯ ∨ β.
Remark 4.5. In Frege systems, distinguishing atoms from formula variables is unnec-
essary because we only instantiate rules by general substitution (as opposed to renam-
ing). So, from now on, we assume that CoS atoms correspond to Frege formula vari-
ables. Since in system Frege we have a connective for negation, we can also assume that
when dual atoms and formula variables appear in an SKSg formula, their Frege translation
only uses ¬; for example, the SKSg formula [A ∨ ¯A] ∧ [a ∨ a¯] is translated into Frege for-
mula [A ∨ ¬A] ∧ [B ∨ ¬B] or [A ∨ ¬A] ∧ [¬B ∨ B] or [¬A ∨ A] ∧ [B ∨ ¬B] or [¬A ∨ A] ∧ [¬B ∨ B].
Conversely, Frege formula [A ∨ ¬A] ∧ [B ∨ ¬B] is translated into SKSg or SKS formula
[a ∨ a¯] ∧ [b ∨ ¯b] or [a ∨ a¯] ∧ [¯b ∨ b] or [a¯ ∨ a] ∧ [b ∨ ¯b] or [a¯ ∨ a] ∧ [¯b ∨ b] or one such for-
mula with formula variables in the place of some of the atoms. As always, we use atoms
when we need to use SKS atomic structural rules, we use formula variables when we need
to instantiate formulae and derivations, and otherwise we can choose both.
Translating Frege into SKSg derivations is straightforward, given that the cut rule of
SKSg can easily simulate modus ponens.
Theorem 4.6. For every Frege derivation Υ with premisses α1, . . . , αh, where h ≥ 0, and
conclusion β, there is a derivation
α1 ∧ · · · ∧ αh
Φ
‖
‖ SKSg
β
; if l and n are, respectively, the length and
size of Υ, then the length and size of Φ are, respectively, O(l) and O(n2).
ON THE PROOF COMPLEXITY OF DEEP INFERENCE 17
Proof. The axioms Fi of Frege are tautologies, so each one has a proof Φi in SKSg, for
1 ≤ i ≤ 17; for example F1 and F10 are, respectively, proved by
Φ1 =
t
i↓ [ ¯A ∨ ¯B] ∨ (A ∧ B)
=
¯A ∨ [ ¯B ∨ (A ∧ B)]
and Φ10 =
t
i↓ (A ∧ (B ∧ ¯C)) ∨ [ ¯A ∨ [ ¯B ∨ C]]
= (A ∧ (B ∧ ¯C)) ∨ [ ¯A ∨ [( ¯B ∧ t) ∨ C]]
i↓ (A ∧ (B ∧ ¯C)) ∨ [ ¯A ∨ [( ¯B ∧ [A ∨ ¯A]) ∨ C]]
s (A ∧ (B ∧ ¯C)) ∨ [ ¯A ∨ [[( ¯B ∧ A) ∨ ¯A] ∨ C]]
= (A ∧ (B ∧ ¯C)) ∨ [(A ∧ ¯B) ∨ [[ ¯A ∨ ¯A] ∨ C]]
c↓ (A ∧ (B ∧ ¯C)) ∨ [(A ∧ ¯B) ∨ [ ¯A ∨ C]]
.
We proceed by induction on the length of Υ = β1, . . . , βk, β and we prove the existence
of a derivation
α1 ∧ · · · ∧ αh
Φ′
‖
‖ SKSg
(β1 ∧ · · · ∧ βk) ∧ β
. The base case k = 0 is as follows: 1) if β is a premiss,
then Φ′ = β; 2) if β ≡ Fiσ, for some i and σ, then Φ′ = Φiσ. For the inductive step,
given Υk = β1, . . . , βk and
γk
Φ′k
‖
‖ SKSg
β1 ∧ · · · ∧ βk
, where γk is the conjunction of premisses of Υk, we
consider the following cases:
• if β is a premiss, then Φ′ =
γk ∧ β
Φ′k∧β
‖
‖ SKSg
(β1 ∧ · · · ∧ βk) ∧ β
;
• if β ≡ Fiσ, for some i and substitution σ, then Φ′ =
γk
Φ′k
‖
‖ SKSg
β1 ∧ · · · ∧ βk
= (β1 ∧ · · · ∧ βk) ∧ t
(β1∧···∧βk)∧Φiσ ‖‖ SKSg
(β1 ∧ · · · ∧ βk) ∧ β
;
• if β is the conclusion of an instance
βk′ βk′ → β
mp
β
, where βk′′ ≡ βk′ → β and
1 ≤ k′, k′′ ≤ k, then
Φ′ =
γk
Φ′k
‖
‖ SKSg
β1 ∧ · · · ∧ βk′′ ∧ · · · ∧ βk
c↑
β1 ∧ · · · ∧ βk′ ∧ · · · ∧ (βk′′ ∧ βk′′ ) ∧ · · · ∧ βk
c↑
β1 ∧ · · · ∧ (βk′ ∧ βk′ ) ∧ · · · ∧ (βk′′ ∧ βk′′ ) ∧ · · · ∧ βk
= (β1 ∧ · · · ∧ βk) ∧ (βk′ ∧ [ ¯βk′ ∨ β])
s (β1 ∧ · · · ∧ βk) ∧ [(βk′ ∧ ¯βk′ ) ∨ β]i↑ (β1 ∧ · · · ∧ βk) ∧ [f ∨ β]
= (β1 ∧ · · · ∧ βk) ∧ β
,
where, without loss of generality, we assumed k′ < k′′.
At every inductive step the length of the SKSg derivation is only increased by an O(1)
number of inference steps. From
α1 ∧ · · · ∧ αh
Φ′
‖
‖ SKSg
(β1 ∧ · · · ∧ βk) ∧ β
we can obtain the desired derivation
α1 ∧ · · · ∧ αh
Φ
‖
‖ SKSg
β
by applying once the w↑ rule. So, the length of Φ is O(k). From this, and after
inspecting the aforesaid derivations, it follows that |Φ| ∈ O(k2m), where m is the maximum
size of a formula appearing in Υ, and so |Φ| ∈ O(n2), where |Υ| = n. 
Corollary 4.7. SKSg and SKS p-simulate Frege.
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Proof. The statement for SKSg follows from Theorem 4.6, and that for SKS from this and
Corollary 2.23. 
Translating derivations from SKSg to Frege requires more effort than the converse,
partly because of the need to simulate deep inference, and partly because of the large
‘amount of inference’ of =-rule instances. The next two lemmas take care of these two
issues.
Lemma 4.8. For every SKS context ξ{ } and formulae α and β, there is a Frege derivation
with premiss α→β and conclusion ξ{α}→ξ{β} whose length is O(m) and size is O(n2), where
m = |ξ{ }| and n = |ξ{α} → ξ{β}|.
Proof. Consider four Frege proofs Υ′, Υ′′, Υ′′′, and Υ′′′′, respectively of the four tautolo-
gies
(A → B) → ([A ∨ C] → [B ∨ C]) , (A → B) → ([C ∨ A] → [C ∨ B]) ,
(A → B) → ((A ∧ C) → (B ∧ C)) , (A → B) → ((C ∧ A) → (C ∧ B)) .
We proceed by induction on the structure of ξ{ }. If ξ{ } ≡ ξ1{{ } ∨ γ1}, we build Frege
derivation
Υ1 = α → β,Υ
′{A/α, B/β,C/γ1}, α ∨ γ1 → β ∨ γ1 ;
we build Υ1 similarly if ξ{ } ≡ ξ1{{ } ∧ γ1} or ξ{ } ≡ ξ1{γ1 ∨ { }} or ξ{ } ≡ ξ1{γ1 ∧ { }}.
Given ξ1{ } ≡ ξ2{{ } ∨ γ2} or ξ1{ } ≡ ξ2{{ } ∧ γ2} or ξ1{ } ≡ ξ2{γ2 ∨ { }} or ξ1{ } ≡
ξ2{γ2 ∧ { }} we build Υ2 analogously to Υ1, and the premiss of Υ2 is the conclusion of
Υ1. We proceed this way until we build Υl, whose conclusion is ξ{α} → ξ{β}, where l ≤ m.
We obtain the desired derivation Υ by concatenating Υ1, . . . , Υl. Since the length and size
of Υ′, Υ′′, Υ′′′, and Υ′′′′ are independent of ξ{ }, α, and β, the length of Υ is O(m) and its
size is O(mn), and so O(n2). 
Lemma 4.9. For every SKS formulae α and β such that α = β there is a Frege derivation
with premiss α, conclusion β, length O(n3), and size O(n4), where n = |α| + |β|.
Proof. Consider the following tautologies, derived from the equations in Figure 1:
(1)
[A ∨ B] ↔ [B ∨ A] , [A ∨ f] ↔ A ,
(A ∧ B) ↔ (B ∧ A) , (A ∧ t) ↔ A ,
[[A ∨ B] ∨ C] ↔ [A ∨ [B ∨ C]] , [t ∨ t] ↔ t ,
((A ∧ B) ∧ C) ↔ (A ∧ (B ∧ C)) , (f ∧ f) ↔ f ,
where each expression corresponds to the two tautologies obtained by orientating each
double implication. Every such tautology can be proved in Frege with a constant-size
proof, so every instance γ→ γ′ of any of these tautologies has a Frege proof of length O(1)
and size O(m′), where m′ = |γ| + |γ′|. By Lemma 4.8, for every ξ{ } there is a derivation
with premiss γ → γ′ and conclusion ξ{γ} → ξ{γ′} whose length is O(m) and size is O(m2),
where m = |ξ{γ} → ξ{γ′}|. By concatenating the proof and derivation so obtained, we can
build a proof of ξ{γ} → ξ{γ′} whose length is O(m) and size is O(m2). By Remark 2.9, we
can build a chain of implications
α ≡ α1 → · · · → αh ≡ δ ≡ βk → · · · → β1 ≡ β ,
where δ is a canonical form for α and β, h + k is O(n2), and each implication αi → αi+1 and
βi+1 → βi is a tautology of the form ξ{γ} → ξ{γ′}, such that γ → γ′ is an instance of one of
the tautologies 1. By concatenating the proofs of every ξ{γ} → ξ{γ′} by mp, we obtain a
derivation with premiss α, conclusion β, length O(n3), and size O(n4). 
Lemma 4.10. For every inference step αν
β
, where ν is a rule of SKSg, there is a Frege
derivation with premiss α, conclusion β, length O(n), and size O(n2), where n = |α| + |β|.
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Proof. Each of the following tautologies, corresponding to the inference rules in Figure 2,
can be proved in Frege with a constant-size proof:
(2)
(A ∧ ¬A) → f , A → t , A → (A ∧ A) ,
f → [A ∨ ¬A] , f → A , [A ∨ A] → A ,
(A ∧ [B ∨ C]) → [(A ∧ B) ∨ C] .
Let
α
ν
β
=
ξ{γ}
ν
ξ{δ}
, where
γ
ν
δ
is an instance of ν. There is a Frege proof Υ of γ → δ,
whose length is O(1) and size is O(n), obtained by instantiating the corresponding proof to
ν among those in 2. By Lemma 4.8, there exists a Frege derivation Υ′ with premiss γ → δ,
conclusion ξ{γ} → ξ{δ}, length O(n), and size O(n2). By concatenating Υ and Υ′ we obtain
a proof Υ′′ of ξ{γ} → ξ{δ}. From Υ′′, by using mp, we obtain the desired derivation with
premiss α ≡ ξ{γ} and conclusion β ≡ ξ{δ}. 
Theorem 4.11. For every derivation
α
Φ
‖
‖ SKSg
β
there is a Frege derivation Υ with premiss
α and conclusion β; if n is the size of Φ, then the length and size of Υ are, respectively,
O(n4) and O(n5).
Proof. The statement immediately follows from Lemmas 4.9 and 4.10, after assuming that
the length of Φ is O(n). 
Corollary 4.12. Frege p-simulates SKSg and SKS.
Remark 4.13. As evidenced by the proofs of Theorems 4.6 and 4.11, it does not really
matter, for establishing the p-simulations, precisely which inference rules are adopted by
the CoS and Frege systems. In fact, the simulations work because the simulating systems
are implicationally complete and their set of proofs is closed under substitution. This way,
the constant-size proofs in one system, simulating the rules of the other system, can be
instantiated at a linear cost in order to simulate instances of rules. We can then use a ro-
bustness theorem (see Theorem 4.2) for Frege in order to establish a robustness theorem
for CoS, possibly also for systems on mutually different languages: given two implication-
ally complete CoS systems, we p-simulate each in two appropriate Frege systems and use
Frege robustness.
5. Extension and Substitution
In this section, we show how CoS systems can be extended with the Tseitin exten-
sion rule and with the substitution rule, analogously to Frege systems. We also show the
p-equivalence of all these systems, as described in the box of the diagram in the Introduc-
tion. As always, we operate under robustness theorems (relying on the mentioned one,
Theorem 4.2) that ensure that the proof complexity properties we establish for the specific
systems actually hold for the formalisms they belong to.
Definition 5.1. An extended Frege (proof ) system is a Frege system augmented with the
(Tseitin) extension rule, which is a rule with no premisses and whose instances A ↔ β are
such that the variable A does not appear before in the derivation, nor appears in β or in
the conclusion of the proof. We write A < α to state that variables A and ¯A do not appear
in formula α. The symbol ↔ stands for logical equivalence, and the specific syntax of the
expressions A ↔ β depends on the language of the Frege system in use. In the following,
we consider A ↔ β a shortcut for (A → β) ∧ (β → A). We denote by xFrege the proof system
where a proof is a derivation with no premisses, conclusion αk, and shape
α1, . . . , αi1−1,
αi1 ≡︷  ︸︸  ︷
A1 ↔ β1 , αi1+1, . . . , αih−1,
αih ≡︷  ︸︸  ︷
Ah ↔ βh , αih+1, . . . , αk ,
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where all the conclusions of extension instances αi1 , . . . , αih are singled out and
A1 < α1, . . . , αi1−1, β1, αk , . . . , Ah < α1, . . . , αih−1, βh, αk ,
and the rest of the proof is as in Frege.
Remark 5.2. We could have equivalently defined an xFrege proof of α as a Frege deriva-
tion with conclusion α and premisses {A1 ↔ β1, . . . , Ah ↔ βh} such that A1, ¯A1, . . . , Ah, ¯Ah
are mutually distinct and A1 < β1, α and . . . and Ah < β1, . . . , βh, α. Notice that xFrege
is indeed a proof system in the sense that it proves tautologies. In fact, given the xFrege
proof just mentioned, we obtain a Frege proof by applying to it, in order, the substitutions
σh = Ah/βh, . . . , σ1 = A1/β1, and by prepending to it proofs of the tautologies β1 ↔ β1,
(β2↔β2)σ1, . . . , (βh↔βh)σh−1 · · ·σ1. In general, a proof so obtained is exponentially bigger
than the xFrege one it derives from.
SKSg can analogously be extended, but there is no need to create a special rule; we
only need to broaden the criterion by which we recognize a proof.
Definition 5.3. An extended SKSg proof of α is an SKSg derivation with conclusion α
and premiss [ ¯A1 ∨ β1] ∧ [ ¯β1 ∨ A1] ∧ · · · ∧ [ ¯Ah ∨ βh] ∧ [ ¯βh ∨ Ah], where A1, ¯A1, . . . , Ah, ¯Ah are
mutually distinct and A1 < β1, α and . . . and Ah < β1, . . . , βh, α. We denote by xSKSg the
proof system whose proofs are extended SKSg proofs.
Theorem 5.4. For every xFrege proof of length l and size n there exists an xSKSg proof
of the same formula and whose length and size are, respectively, O(l) and O(n2).
Proof. Consider an xFrege proof as in Definition 5.1. By Remark 5.2 and Theorem 4.6,
there exists the following xSKSg proof, whose length and size are yielded by 4.6:
[ ¯A1 ∨ β1] ∧ [ ¯β1 ∨ A1] ∧ · · · ∧ [ ¯Ah ∨ βh] ∧ [ ¯βh ∨ Ah]
‖
‖ SKSg
αk
.

Although not strictly necessary to establish the equivalence of the four extended for-
malisms (see diagram in the Introduction), the following theorem is very easy to prove.
Theorem 5.5. For every xSKSg proof of size n there exists an xFrege proof of the same
formula and whose length and size are, respectively, O(n4) and O(n5).
Proof. Consider an xSKSg proof as in Definition 5.3. The statement is an immediate
consequence of Theorem 4.11, after observing that there is an O(h)-length and O(hn)-size
xFrege proof
A1 ↔ β1, . . . , Ah ↔ βh, . . . , (A1 ↔ β1) ∧ · · · ∧ (Ah ↔ βh) .

Corollary 5.6. Systems xFrege and xSKSg are p-equivalent.
We now move to the substitution rule.
Definition 5.7. A substitution Frege (proof ) system is a Frege system augmented with
the substitution rule
A
sub
Aσ
. We denote by sFrege the proof system where a proof is a
derivation with no premisses, conclusion αk, and shape
α1, . . . , αi1−1,
αi1 ≡︷︸︸︷
α j1σ1 , αi1+1, . . . , αih−1,
αih ≡︷︸︸︷
α jhσh , αih+1, . . . , αk ,
where all the conclusions of substitution instances αi1 , . . . , αih are singled out, α j1 ∈
{α1, . . . , αi1−1}, . . . , α jh ∈ {α1, . . . , αih−1}, and the rest of the proof is as in Frege.
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We rely on the following result.
Theorem 5.8. (Cook-Reckhow and Krajı´cˇek-Pudla´k, [CR79, KP89]) Systems xFrege
and sFrege are p-equivalent.
We can extend SKSg with the same substitution rule as for Frege. The rule is used like
other proper rules of system SKSg, so its instances are interleaved with =-rule instances.
Definition 5.9. An sSKSg proof is a proof of SKSg where, in addition to the inference
steps generated by rules of SKSg, we admit inference steps obtained as instances of the
substitution rule
A
sub
Aσ
.
This rule does not fit any of the usual deep-inference rule classes (see Section 2), and (as
in Frege systems) is not sound, in the sense that the premiss does not imply the conclusion.
However, of course, if the premiss is provable the conclusion also is.
Remark 5.10. Notice that instances of the substitution rule cannot be used inside a context;
for example, the expression on the left is not a valid sSKSg proof, while the one on the
right is:
t
i↓
A ∨ ¯A
sub? (B ∧ C) ∨ ¯A
,
t
i↓
A ∨ ¯A
sub (B ∧ C) ∨ [ ¯B ∨ ¯C]
.
In the so-called ‘Formalism B’ of deep inference, which is currently under development
[Gug04], and for which all the proof-complexity results in this article apply unchanged,
substitution becomes part of the composition mechanism of proofs, rather than an odd
extension to the set of rules.
For the time being, we can establish the promised p-equivalence of all extended systems
by completing the diagram in the Introduction with the last two missing steps.
Theorem 5.11. For every xSKSg proof of size n there exists an sSKSg proof of the same
formula and whose length and size are, respectively, O(n) and O(n2).
Proof. Consider the xSKSg proof
[ ¯A1 ∨ β1] ∧ [ ¯β1 ∨ A1] ∧ · · · ∧ [ ¯Ah ∨ βh] ∧ [ ¯βh ∨ Ah]
Φ
‖
‖ SKSg
α
, where
A1 < β1, α ,
. . . ,
Ah < β1, . . . , βh, α ,
and let us call its premiss γ. We can build the sSKSg proof
t
i↓
γ¯ ∨ γ
γ¯∨Φ
‖
‖ SKSg
[(A1 ∧ ¯β1) ∨ (β1 ∧ ¯A1) ∨ · · · ∨ (Ah ∧ ¯βh) ∨ (βh ∧ ¯Ah)] ∨ α
sub [(A1 ∧ ¯β1) ∨ (β1 ∧ ¯A1) ∨ · · · ∨ (βh ∧ ¯βh) ∨ (βh ∧ ¯βh)] ∨ α
c↓ [(A1 ∧ ¯β1) ∨ (β1 ∧ ¯A1) ∨ · · · ∨ (βh ∧ ¯βh)] ∨ αi↑ [(A1 ∧ ¯β1) ∨ (β1 ∧ ¯A1) ∨ · · · ∨ f] ∨ α
=
...
= [(A1 ∧ ¯β1) ∨ (β1 ∧ ¯A1)] ∨ α
sub [(β1 ∧ ¯β1) ∨ (β1 ∧ ¯β1)] ∨ α
c↓ (β1 ∧ ¯β1) ∨ αi↑
f ∨ α
=
α
.
22 PAOLA BRUSCOLI AND ALESSIO GUGLIELMI

Corollary 5.12. sSKSg p-simulates xSKSg.
Theorem 5.13. For every sSKSg proof of size n there exists a proof of the same formula
in sFrege, whose length and size are, respectively, O(n4) and O(n5).
Proof. Every sSKSg proof has shape
t
Φ0
‖
‖ SKSg
α1
sub
α1σ1
Φ1
‖
‖ SKSg
...
Φh−1
‖
‖ SKSg
αh
sub
αhσh
Φh
‖
‖ SKSg
αh+1
.
By Theorem 4.11, for each of Φ0, . . . , Φh there exist Frege derivations Υ0, . . . , Υh with
the same premiss and conclusion, respectively. We can then build the proof
Υ0︷ ︸︸ ︷
. . . , α1 ,
Υ1︷    ︸︸    ︷
α1σ1, . . . , . . . ,
Υh−1︷ ︸︸ ︷
. . . , αh ,
Υh︷            ︸︸            ︷
αhσh, . . . , αh+1
in sFrege; the cited theorem also yields its length and size. 
Corollary 5.14. sFrege p-simulates sSKSg.
Nothing prevents us from using Tseitin extension and the substitution rule with system
SKS, or any other atomic or nonatomic CoS system. The integration of these mechanisms
into CoS is similar to their integration into Frege systems, as the simplicity of the argu-
ments showing p-equivalence testifies.
6. Open Problems
We conclude the article with a list of open problems, some of which are currently in-
vestigated by us and other researchers.
6.1. Relation with Resolution and Other Formalisms. In this article, we explored the
relation between CoS and Frege systems, and in the cited literature the relation between
CoS and Gentzen systems has been explored in depth. There are, of course, other for-
malisms, like resolution, whose relation with CoS might lead to some interesting research
directions. For example, the note [Gug03] shows how simply, compared to Gentzen sys-
tems, KS expresses resolution (analytically, of course).
6.2. Does Cocontraction Provide for an Exponential Speedup? As we argued in Re-
mark 3.6, we do not know whether KSg p-simulates KSg ∪ {c↑}, or, equivalently, whether
KS p-simulates KS ∪ {ac↑}.
Our intuition, as well as some clues, like the mutual behaviour of the ‘atomic flows’
of contraction and cocontraction (see [GG08]) would lead us to believe that cocontraction
indeed provides for an exponential speedup. However, we know that in similar situations,
like for dag-like versus tree-like Frege systems, intuition was fallacious.
If cocontraction yields an exponential speedup, we obtain an even stronger analytic
system than KSg, which is, in turn, stronger than analytic Gentzen. This would draw
interest to a hierarchy of analytic proof systems of different strength.
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Unless we prove the p-equivalence of KSg and KSg ∪ {c↑}, we tend to consider cocon-
traction a simple rule-based mechanism for compressing proofs, like cut, extension, and
substitution.
6.3. Pigeonhole in Analytic CoS. Does the pigeonhole principle, in particular in its rela-
tional variety, admit polynomially growing proofs in KS? If not, does it in KS ∪ {ac↑}?
Investigating this problem could be relevant to the more general, following one (Prob-
lem 6.4), about the ability of analytic CoS to simulate CoS, and so Frege. In fact, the
pigeonhole principle generates some of the hardest classes of tautologies known.
We note that in [Jap08], Japaridze shows polynomially growing proofs for the pigeon-
hole class of tautologies in a deep-inference system over certain circuit-like sequents,
called ‘cirquents’. In this case, the speedup is obtained by the sharing of logical expres-
sions in circuits.
In [Jerˇ09], Jerˇa´bek shows that there are polynomial-time constructible proofs in KS ∪
{ac↑} of the functional and onto variants of the pigeonhole principle.
6.4. Relative Strength of Analytic CoS and CoS. Some recent major progress has been
made in [Jerˇ09]. There, Jerˇa´bek uses a construction on threshold formulae in the mono-
tone sequent calculus, by Atserias, Galesi and Pudla´k [AGP02], to show that analytic CoS
quasipolynomially simulates CoS. In [BGGP09], we provide a direct and simplified con-
struction based on atomic flows [GG08] and threshold formulae.
Because of these recent advances, we expect that analytic CoS p-simulates CoS. A more
in-depth discussion of this subject is in [BGGP09]. If analytic CoS p-simulates CoS, then
there are polynomially growing proofs of the pigeonhole principle in analytic CoS, though
not necessarily in KS.
We think that investigating this problem will help us to better understand analyticity, in
order to obtain for it a general and more useful definition than the one we have now. We
feel that the current notion is not satisfactory because it depends on the formalism and must
be defined by resorting to the syntactic structure of inference rules (or, worse, by indicating
which rules are analytic and which are not).
For example, a more general, nonsyntactic definition of analyticity could be the follow-
ing: a rule is analytic if, given an instance of its conclusion, the set of possible instances
of the premiss is finite (this is what we call a finitely generating rule in Section 2). In this
sense, an atomic ‘finitary’ cut rule
ξ{a ∧ a¯}
fai↑
ξ{t}
, such that a appears in ξ{ }, would be ana-
lytic. However, [BG04] shows that we can easily transform proofs in SKS into smaller- or
equal-size proofs that only use fai↑ wherever ai↑ was used. So, we could deem fai↑ an ana-
lytic rule, and the system obtained from SKS by substituting ai↑ with fai↑ an analytic one,
and we could immediately conclude that analytic CoS p-simulates CoS. This ‘solution’,
however, is way too cheap.
We prefer to think that fai↑ is not an analytic rule, in some sense to be made precise. A
possible point of attack is offered by the fact that fai↑ is not a local rule: it requires checking
that a appears in its context, whose size is unbounded (see Remark 2.17). So, we think it
could be productive to look for a notion of analyticity that is based on boundedness instead
of finiteness, and tackle the separation problem between analytic CoS and CoS under that
notion. The note [BG07] further explores this direction, but much more work is necessary.
6.5. Strength of Analytic CoS Systems Plus Substitution. We showed that CoS and
Frege systems are p-equivalent, and both remain p-equivalent when extended either with
Tseitin extension or substitution. However, CoS is more flexible than Frege, because it
allows to ‘switch off’ two mechanisms that potentially provide for an exponential com-
pression of proofs: cut and cocontraction (see Problem 6.2).
It might be interesting to study the relative strength of systems obtained by removing
from SKS ∪ {sub} either ai↑ or ac↑ or both. (Rule aw↑ can also be removed, but we do
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not see a crucial role for it.) Notice that systems KS ∪ {sub} and KS ∪ {ac↑, sub} could be
considered, in some sense, analytic, and we do not know their relative strength.
6.6. Speedup of Deep Inference Over Any Bounded-Depth System. We saw in The-
orem 3.12 that analytic CoS exhibits an exponential speedup over analytic Gentzen, for
Statman tautologies. We argued that, in this case, the speedup is obtained by a rather triv-
ial use of deep inference, because the depth at which inference has to be performed, in
order to get the speedup, is constant. So, a natural question is whether there exists a class
of tautologies that requires full-fledged deep inference in order to obtain efficient proofs.
We think we found such a class, which is defined as follows.
Consider, for every propositional formulaα, the following set of second-order formulae,
for n > 0:
g(1, α) ≡ ∀β.[((α ∧ β) ∧ β) ∨ ( ¯β ∧ ¯β)] ,
g(n + 1, α) ≡ ∀β.[(g(n, α ∧ β) ∧ g(n, β)) ∨ (g(n, ¯β) ∧ g(n, ¯β))] .
By using these formulae as a template, we can generate a set of first-order formulae, where
the (complex) management of indices ensures their uniqueness:
Definition 6.1. Consider, for m, n ≥ 0
h(1,m, α) ≡ ((α ∧ βm+1) ∧ βm+1) ∨ ( ¯βm+1 ∧ ¯βm+1) ,
h(n + 2,m, α) ≡ (h(n + 1,m, α ∧ β5n+1+m) ∧ h(n + 1, 5n + m, β5n+1+m)) ∨
(h(n + 1, 2 · 5n + m, ¯β5n+1+m) ∧ h(n + 1, 3 · 5n + m, ¯β5n+1+m)) .
Consider now
f (n) ≡ h(n, 0, t) , for n > 0 .
We define the set DT = { f (n) | n > 0 }.
The program [Gug07a] can help in understanding the nature of these formulae.
Remark 6.2. It is not difficult to verify that DT contains tautologies possessing analytic
CoS proofs that grow polynomially in the size of the tautologies.
The analytic CoS proofs of the DT tautologies, when read bottom-up, work by applying
interactions starting from the deepest subformulae. When this cannot be the case, we
conjecture that the size of the proofs grows exponentially.
Definition 6.3. The and/or depth of a formula is the maximum number of alternations of
conjunctions and disjunctions in the formula tree; the and/or depth of a context ξ{ } is the
number of alternations of conjunctions and disjunctions between the hole and the root of
the context tree. We define a bounded-depth CoS proof system as a CoS proof system
whose inference rules only generate inference steps at a bounded depth, namely inference
steps
ξ{γ}
ν
ξ{δ}
are such that, if
γ
ν
δ
is a rule instance then the and/or depth of ξ{ } is bounded
by a given constant, and the same restriction holds for the contexts in the context closure
condition of relation =.
Remark 6.4. Note that the nonatomic rules interaction (identity), cointeraction (cut),
contraction and cocontraction require establishing duality or identity of formulae of un-
bounded and/or depth. So, their adoption might be considered an implicit use of deep in-
ference. However, the atomic counterparts of these rules do not suffer this problem because
the ‘deep checking’ is delegated to the inference mechanism. For this reason, proving the
following conjecture is better done in the analytic part of system SKS.
Conjecture 6.5. In any analytic bounded-depth CoS proof system, the tautologies in DT
only have proofs that grow exponentially in their size.
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7. Conclusion
In this article, we showed that the calculus of structures (CoS) has the same character-
istics of the Frege formalism in terms of proof complexity, including when extended with
Tseitin extension and substitution.
We know that, contrary to Frege, CoS has a rich proof theory, and its proof systems
enjoy several properties, arguably relevant to proof complexity, that cannot be observed in
other formalisms, like locality for all inference rules. We also know that other logics, like
modal logics, enjoy simple and modular presentations in deep inference, which should help
in proof complexity investigations. This article establishes the basic connection between
proof theory in deep inference and proof complexity.
As a consequence of its flexibility in inference rule design, CoS admits a notion of
analyticity that is more flexible than its counterpart for Gentzen systems. We can then
explore the strength of analytic systems in finer detail than possible in Gentzen systems. In
this article, we moved forward the boundary between polynomial and exponential analytic
proofs by proving Statman tautologies with polynomial, analytic deep-inference proofs.
We included a list of open problems and currently active research directions.
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